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that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that, if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible, I was sure we could secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary and told him that as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published. This second telegram does not seem to have been published.

GERMAN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUÉ ANENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PRINCE
LICHNOWSKY AND SIR EDWARD GREY ¹

(Translation)

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of September 5, 1914, contains the following official statement:

According to news received in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, has made a statement to the effect that the exchange of telegrams between Germany and England, prior to the war, as published by the German Government, *was incomplete*.

The Secretary alleged that Prince Lichnowsky had cancelled his report anent the well-known telephonic conversation, immediately afterwards, by telegraph, after he had been enlightened that there was a *misunderstanding*. This telegram, however, had not been published.

Moreover, the *Times*, apparently on information from official quarters, has made an identical statement, with the comment that the *German Government had suppressed* the telegram in question, in order to be able to accuse England of perfidy, and to prove Germany's pacific intentions.

In contradiction to these statements, we hereby affirm *that a telegram of the alleged contents does not exist!*

Besides the telegram already published, which was despatched from London on August 1st, 11 A. M., Prince Lichnowsky sent on the same day, the following telegrams to Berlin:

(1) At 1.15 P. M.

"The Private Secretary of Sir Edward Grey just called to inform me: The Minister wished to make propositions to me for the neutrality of England, even in the event

¹ Appendix to the authorized translation of the German White Book, issued by the German Government and published in America by *The Fatherland*, New York City.

of our going to war with Russia, as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will at once report."

(2) At 5.30 P. M.

"Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration which had been unanimously applied by the Cabinet:

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply, as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public opinion in this country."

"To my question, whether he could give me a definite guaranty as to the neutrality of England in case we respected the neutrality of Belgium, the Minister responded that he was unable to do so. However, this question would have an important bearing upon English public opinion. If, in a war against France, we should violate the neutrality of Belgium, it would surely cause a change in public opinion which would make it very difficult for the British Government to maintain an amicable neutrality. So far, there was not the slightest intention to take hostile measures against us. The desire prevailed of refraining from such measures, as far as possible. Yet one could hardly draw a line up to which we might safely proceed, without calling forth British intervention. He repeatedly recurred to the neutrality of Belgium, and said that this question would, at all events play a great rôle. He said that he had already thought it over whether it would be possible that we and France would, in the event of a Russian war, remain in a state of armed opposition, without attacking each other. I asked him whether he was in a position to declare that France would be prepared to enter such a pact. Since we had no intention of either annihilating France, nor of annexing parts of her territory, I was inclined to think that we might be open for such an agreement which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said that he would make inquiries, adding that he did not under-rate the difficulties of maintaining military inactivity on both sides."

(3) At 8.30 P. M.

"My report of this morning is cancelled by my report of tonight. Since positive English proposals are not forthcoming, further steps in the direction indicated in (Your Excellency's) instructions are useless."

Obviously, the above telegrams contain no hint whatsoever that there had been a misunderstanding, nor anything about the removal of the alleged misunderstanding, as affirmed by the English statesman.